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out, the fact that the plaintiff had credible evidence showing how it
arrived at both the rentals and the option prices indicated that the
parties intended to enter into lease-option agreements and not con-
ditional sales. The case leaves open the question as to whether
rental payments must be related to use where the latter can be de-
termined. Jerry L. Haushalter
Zoning: Restriction of Church Construction in Residential Dis-
tricts-A Village of Bayside, Milwaukee County, ordinance of 1954
failed to provide any district wherein a church could be constructed.
The Lake Drive Baptist Church obtained its property, partly by gift
and partly by option, from a parishioner, in 1955, after it had been
given an encouraging reception from the Bayside village board con-
cerning the building of a church on the property. A plat plan and plans
for construction and off street parking were submitted to the board
upon request.
In 1956 the board engaged a consultant to aid in determining areas
suitable for institutional purposes. After this the zoning ordinance was
amended to provide for several class "E" districts in which land could
be used for institutional purposes including churches. However, rela-
tor's property was not included in a class "E" district, despite the rec-
ommendation of the planning commission. In 1957 the church presented
plans and specifications drawn by its architects along with its applica-
tion for a building permit. The planning commission recommended
rezoning the property into a class "E" district. The village board denied
the request, apparently basing its action on 1). a petition signed by
three hundred residents of the village which requested that the board
preserve the residential character of the area; 2). the traffic problems
involved; 3). the decrease in property values in the area resulting from
the construction of a church.
Relator sought a writ of mandamus to force the issuance of a build-
ing permit on the grounds that the action of the village board was
arbitrary and capricious. The trial court held that the board was within
its authority under the zoning provisions as found in the Constitution
of the United States, and that the equities were in favor of the board.
The trial court apparently relied upon the factors considered by the
village board in reaching its decision and considered that these out-
weighed any claim that could be made by the church. The Supreme
Court held, that the action of the board was arbitrary and capricious.
It remanded the cause with directions to enjoin enforcement of the
zoning ordinance against construction of the church on relator's site,
rentals do not equal the above, the lessee can apply the rentals to the pur-
chase price. Truman Bowen v. Commissioner, supra note 5.
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and to compel the building inspector to issue a building permit. State
ex rel Lake Drive Baptist Church v. Village of Bayside, 12 Wis. 2d 585,
108 N.W. 2d 288 (1961).
Since the land mark case of Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler
Realty Company, it has been established that "zoning and kindred regu-
lations must find their justification in some aspect of the police power."'
The application of this principle to zoning ordinances which seek to
regulate the building of churches in a community has caused the courts
considerable difficulty. In the principal case justice Fairchild, speaking
for the court, and referring to an Oregon case,2 classified ordinances
involving the problem into three categories: 1). those permitting
churches in all districts; 2). those permitting churches in certain dis-
tricts only by special permit after a hearing; and 3). those excluding
churches often, if not usually, from districts where residential use in
itself is restricted to certain types of dwellings. The validity of a zon-
ing ordinance which falls within any one of these categories depends
upon the interpretation of the "general welfare" provision of the police
power.3 A complete analysis of the development of the "general wel-
fare" provision is beyond the scope of this article.
Although there is a decided split of authority as to interpretation, a
general statement of the attitude of the courts toward the "general wel-
fare" provision can be found in an opinion of the New Jersey court:
While some of the earlier cases seemingly confine the [zoning]
authority to such regulations as are needful for the public health,
the public safety, and the public morals, such measures as are
fairly requisite for the 'public convenience' and the 'general
prosperity' are now considered as within the category. This re-
serve element of sovereignty embraces action conducive to social
well being.4
Through interpretation of this general statement as applied to zon-
ing, courts fall within two categories: those taking a negative view,
allowing restriction or elimination for the health-safety, economic rea-
sons as deletorious to the "general welfare", and those which, while
recognizing these negative aspects as important, add the more positive
element of the inherent value of locating certain institutions in an area
easily accessible for those they serve.
The first named, which from the viewpoint of a more comprehensive
use of the zoning power can be called the broad view, is well expressed
by the Massachusetts court: "The primary purpose of zoning is the
1272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2 Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Or. 821, 330 P.2d 5,
74 A.L.R.2d 347 (1958).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
4 Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment of the City of Newark, 9 N.J. 405, 88 A.2d
607,611 (1952).
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preservation in the public interest of certain neighborhoods against
uses which are believed to be deleterious to such neighborhoods." 5 This
broad viewpoint holds that there is an economic devaluation of property
which occurs with the presence of a church in a residential district
sufficient to invoke the police power to zone out churches to avoid the
deleterious effect, e.g., traffic congestion resulting from such presence
of a church in a built up residential area is dangerous to the safety of
persons, especially children, living there. An Oregon court reiterated
this viewpoint by saying that churches should no longer be placed in a
special category of judicial favoritism which exempts them from the
zoning laws, and which allows them to have such deleterious effect on a
neighborhood. 6 In short, these courts hold that a zoning regulation
which forbids the building of churches in certain districts ".... bears a
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals and general
welfare because it tends to promote and perpetuate the American home
and protect its civil and social values."17
The stricter interpretation of the general statement proceeds along
an entirely different path of reasoning. Representative of this view-
point, which would deny the zoning out of churches from residential
districts, is a statement of the Ohio supreme court: "Truly to accom-
plish its great religious and social function, the church should be inte-
grated into the home life of the community which it serves."' 8 Integra-
tion of the church into the homelife of the community while allowing
zoning out of churches from residential districts would be obvious in-
compatibles.
This strict view considers the possible effect of a church upon pro-
perty values; but, for the most part, it places the high purposes served
by the church and the necessary integration of the church with the
people it serves above the economic considerations. The New York
court of appeals has said that ". . . in view of the high purposes, and
the moral values of these institutions, mere pecuniary loss to a few
persons should not bar their erection and use."9
But even this strict interpretation, which usually would not allow
the zoning out of churches from residential districts, is subject to quali-
fication. For example, if substantial loss would result, the second type of
ordinance could be utilized, i.e., that which would allow churches to be
5 Kaplan v. City of Boston, 330 Mass. 381, 113 N.E.2d 856, 858 (1953).
6 Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, supra note 2.
7 Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of the Latter-Day Saints v. City of
Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823, 825 (1949).
s State ex rel Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran Church in America v. Joseph,
139 Ohio St. 239, 39 N.E.2d 515, 524 (1942).
9 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board of Town of Brighton, 1 N.Y. 2d
508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 858 (1956).
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constructed in certain residential districts by special permit.10 This, in
effect, would be possible by balancing the factors of the desirability of
having the institution accessible to those it serves and the desirability
of retaining the peace and quiet, the higher property values, and the
absence of congested traffic in the particular neighborhood. Here the
norm for deciding would be whether or not the action denying a special
permit would be arbitrary and capricous. 11
In the Bayside case12 the Wisconsin court did not commit itself to
either the broad or the strict view of the "general welfare" clause.
However, from another recent decision of the Wisconsin court we
can draw an inference as to which interpretation the court would adopt.
In State ex rel Wisconsin Lutheran High School v. Sinar,13 it was held
that private and parochial high schools could be excluded from a resi-
dential district in which all grade and public high schools would be
allowed. The basis of this decision was that while all high schools
would present detrimental effects, public high schools present certain
advantages which the zoning authority could have considered compen-
sating.
From this alone it cannot be concluded that Wisconsin would adopt
the broad view, which allows the zoning out of churches from certain
residential areas. But, in the Bayside case, while choosing not to decide
this more basic question, it was stated: "This court has upheld the ex-
clusion of private and parochial high schools from a district where
public high schools are permitted .... ,,14 The inference can be drawn
that, if the court were to have the question squarely before it, churches
would be placed in the same category as private and parochial high
schools; the zoning authority could find certain advantages in zoning
out churches compensating for the loss of accessibility to those they
serve. In any event, Justice Fairchild, speaking for three members of
the court, did decide that the action of the village of Bayside was arbi-
trary and capricous.15
In a concurring opinion Justice Hallows, also speaking for three
members of the court, seems to adopt the more strict interpretation of
the general principle that would not usually allow the zoning out of
churches from residential districts:
10 "... exclusion in individual instances must be justified on such factors as
congested traffic, noise, loss of tax revenue, etc."
Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 377, 381 (1960).
11 "The terms 'arbitrary and capricious' when used in a matter like the instant
one must mean wilfull and unreasoning action without consideration and in
disregard of the facts and circumstances of the case." Milwaukie Co. of
Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, supra note 2, at 12.
12 State ex rel Lake Drive Baptist Church v. Village of Bayside, 12 Wis. 2d
585, 108 N.W. 2d 288 (1961).
13267 Wis. 91, 65 N.W.2d 43 (1954).
14Supra note 12, at 601.
15 Ibid.
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The church in our society has long been identified with family
and residential life. Churches traditionally have been and should
be located in that part of the community where people live. They
should be easily and conveniently located to the home. Churches
are not super markets, manufacturing plants or commercial es-
tablishments and should not be restricted to such areas. How
can tht exclusion of churches from a residential area promote
public morals or the general welfare? To so hold is a failure to
understand the purpose and the influence of churches.1 6
The solution to the problems presented by the presence of a church-
traffic congestion, noise, and inconvenience-is in reasonable regula-
tion, not in absolute prohibition.
This concurring opinion explicitly rejects the broad interpretation
of the general principle, allowing the zoning out of churches from
residential areas, as a step toward relegating churches to commercial
and industrial districts. To say that municipalities would not do this is
not enough-they could do this. And there are limits beyond which
government cannot go in exercising its zoning power. Since the church
is considered desirable in a residential district by many, it cannot be
said that the "general welfare" allows a municipality to completely
zone out churches from residential districts.
Referring to the Sinar case 7 Justice Hallows accords with the
reasoning of the dissent in which Justice Steinle said: "Private high
schools as well as public high schools promote the general welfare and
there is no substantial distinction in the purpose in which they
serve .. ."18 For that reason, permitting the one and excluding the
other in the same land use district is invalid. In the principal case, Jus-
tice Hallows discards the distinction between school and church since
the same reasons for exclusion would apply to both, viz., traffic conges-
tion, noise, inconvenience, resulting in decrease in property values. Ex-
clusion of either private schools, or churches, or both, override the ob-
jections.
Justice Currie, dissenting in the Bayside case, adopted the broad
interpretation of the general principle, which interpretation would allow
the zoning out of churches from residential areas. Decline in property
values, noise, and traffic congestion are mentioned as reasons which
allow for the invocation of the police power of the state based on gen-
eral welfare. The situation where schools would be allowed in certain
districts in which churches would not be allowed is not offensive from
this viewpoint because of "the desirability of having schools within
walking distance of the homes of the majority of the children who
18 Id. at 608, 609.
17 State ex rel Wisconsin Lutheran High School v. Sinar, supra note 13.
is Id. at 102.
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attend,"'19 whereas, according to the dissenting opinion, this is not
necessary for a church, and in fact is often not the case.
Justice Currie did not agree that the action of the village board of
Bayside was arbitrary and capricous since the Lake Drive Baptist
Church had no vested rights at the time the ordinance was passed.
According to the broad viewpoint of the general principe, this con-
clusion of Justice Currie would be correct; for if the legislative power
can be used, its use cannot be questioned by the courts. This view holds
that the factors considered by the village board would be sufficient to
use the authority to zone, and to zone out the "aeleterious effect" cre-
ated by the presence of the church.
The writer agrees with the result in the Bayside case, but believes
that the strict interpretation of the present day statement of the mean-
ing of the "general welfare" provision as adopted by the three con-
curring justices, would have been the more sound basis of decision.
The opinion of the court leaves in doubt which of the two interpreta-
tions of the present day statement of the "general welfare" provision
Wisconsin would adopt. The dissent in this case adopts a view which
is far too broad in its application of municipal zoning power. It allows
purely economic considerations to override those ideas which, histori-
cally, have placed the church in a position within the community from
which it can easily be reached by those it seeks to serve. This viewpoint
is very definitely a furtherance of the general welfare.
PATRICK T. MCMAHON
19 Supra note 12, at 611.
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